PRINCIPLES OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS by Robin Boadway
  Public Policy Review, 2006, Vol.2, No.1 1 
PRINCIPLES OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
 
   
Robin Boadway 
Professor, Department of Economics, Queen's University, Kingston, Canada 
 
   
Abstract 
   This paper summarizes the procedure for the economic evaluation of government projects 
and policy reforms. It begins with the social welfare function underpinnings of cost-benefit 
analysis including the role of distributive weights and the choice of numeraire. It then turns to 
the conduct of a social cost-benefit analysis using the net present value criterion. This includes 
the shadow pricing of market products and inputs affected by the project, indirect welfare 
effects, the opportunity cost of project finance, the evaluation of non-marketed inputs and 
outputs, and the opportunity cost of risk. Issues involved in selecting a discount rate are 
discussed, especially those arising from imperfect capital markets. Finally, since many public 
projects have long-term consequences, the principles that might be used to take account of 
effects of projects on future generations are outlined. Techniques for accounting for these effects, 
such as generational accounting, are summarized and its shortcomings highlighted. 
 
   
 
I.  INTRODUCTION  :  SOME  FOUNDATIONS 
 
   C o s t -benefit analysis in its broadest sense is the process of ranking policy options from an 
economic point of view, taking account of both the benefits of the policy and its costs. The 
policies range from an investment project that is small enough so that a partial equilibrium 
approach will suffice, to a broader fiscal policy change, such as a tax, subsidy or regulation, that 
will have general equilibrium repercussions on several markets. In taking an economic point of 
view, we are concentrating on net benefits of the policy as they affect the well being of 
individual households of the economy, typically as judged by their own preferences. We are 
eschewing political feasibility considerations as well as non-economic objectives, such as 
non-discrimination, liberty, and so on.  
      That does not mean that social values are not involved. Indeed, it is impossible to rank policy 
options without making some important value judgments, but the ones that we make are those 2  R. Boadway / Public Policy Review 
typically involved in applied welfare economics, and it is worth being explicit about them at the 
outset. There are three main ones. The first is the precept of individualism: an individual’s welfare 
should be based on the individual’s own preferences. The second is the Pareto principle: if one 
individual is made better off and none are made worse off as a result of implementing the policy, 
social welfare is taken to increase. The third is the principle referred to as welfarism: social 
orderings of alternative policies depend only on the welfare of individuals and not on extraneous 
considerations (like freedom, non-discrimination, etc.). These principles lead to a set of social 
preferences over allocations of resources that can be summarized in a Bergstrom-Samuelson Social 
Welfare Function (SWF) of the form  () () () () ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ n u , , u , u W L 2 1 , which is increasing in all arguments, and 
where  () ⋅ i u   is the utility of household i as a function of a resource allocation.   
      The SWF represents a preference ordering over individual utilities. As such, it is an ordinal 
concept, so any increasing function of  () n u u u W , , , 2 1 L   will serve just as well. However, the SWF 
requires that individual utilities be measurable and that they be comparable among households. 
There is a sizeable literature, summarized in Boadway and Bruce (1984), on the concepts of 
measurability and comparability of individual utilities functions, and how the extent of 
measurability and comparability influences the form of the utility function. We need not be 
detained by that literature. Instead, we shall adopt for illustrative purposes a particular and 
commonly used form for the SWF that incorporates some reasonable assumptions about 
measurability and comparability, and also allows us to capture social attitudes towards equity 
in a single parameter. The SWF will be assumed to take the following additive form: 
() ( )( ) ∑ ∑ − = =
−
i i i i n u u w u u u W ρ
ρ 1 / , , ,
1
2 1 L  (1) 
where  () i u w   is the social utility of individual i.
1  
   The SWF in (1) has a number of notable properties. The social preference ordering is 
symmetric and anonymous: the same social utility function  () ⋅ w   applies to all individuals, and it 
gives rise to preference orderings that are symmetric around the equal utility points. Thus, in 
the two person case, social indifference curves in () 2 1,u u -space are symmetric around the 
45-degree line. The parameter  ρ   captures society’s aversion to inequality. In particular,  ρ  is 
the elasticity of marginal social utility: 
()




− = ρ   (2) 
We shall refer to  ρ  as the coefficient of aversion to inequality, analogous to the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion in an uncertainty setting. The higher is  ρ , the more aversion there is to 
inequality in utilities. It may be reasonable to assume non-negative aversion to inequality, in 
                                                                            
1  The SWF in (1) is linear homogeneous. Such a form is possible under the assumption that individual 
utility functions are comparable and measurable up to a ratio scale. That is, proportional changes in 
utility are comparable across individuals. Technically, individual utility functions can be subject to 
multiplicative transformations (e.g., 
i u   can be transformed to 
i i i u k v = ) without affecting the social 
ordering. See Boadway and Bruce (1984), Chapter 5.   R. Boadway / Public Policy Review 3 
which case  0 ≥ ρ . This is equivalent to assuming that the SWF  () ⋅ W  is  quasi-concave. The two 
limiting cases are the utilitarian SWF, where  0 = ρ  (so social welfare is just the sum of 
utilities), and the maximin (or Rawlsian) SWF, where  ∞ = ρ   (where social welfare is the utility 
of the least well-off individual).   
   The value of the coefficient of aversion to inequality incorporates a value judgment that 
reasonable people may differ on, and this poses enormous problems for cost-benefit analysis 
since virtually all policy alternatives have different relative effects on different individuals. It is 
not possible to rank such alternatives unless one makes an explicit comparison of utilities of 
different households. Unless one alternative is Pareto superior to another, rankings depend upon 
the SWF that one has in mind. In fact, there are really two levels of value judgment involved in 
arriving at (1). Given individual preference orderings, one first has to measure the utility 
associated with each outcome, that is, formulate the individual utility function  () ⋅ i u , and then 
one has to decide on the social utility function  () u w  to apply to individual utility. As we shall 
see a common procedure for measuring welfare levels in applied welfare economics is to use a 
money metric measure of utility, that is, to measure welfare levels using the values of expenditures 
required to achieve different welfare levels given a set of reference prices. Formally, define the 
real income of household i, denoted i y , by the expenditure function at a set of reference prices 
r p , or: 





i u x u x p u p e y ≥ ≡ = min   ,  (3) 
where x is a vector of commodities. Then, the utility function for household i can be written 
() y ui , where u ′ ′  reflects the rate at which the marginal utility of income declines. If the 
household utility function also takes the constant elasticity form,  () ( ) α
α − = 1 / y y u , the social 
utility function  () () y u w can be transformed into: 
() ( ) σ ν
σ − =
− 1 /
1 y y   (4) 
where ρα α ρ σ + + = . Thus, σ  now becomes the coefficient of aversion to inequality in real 
income. Note, however, whereas the same social utility function  () u w  may be used to convert 
individual utility into social utility, it may well be the case that converting real income to 
individual utility may require an individual-specific utility function  () y ui . For example, 
different households may have different abilities to convert real income to utility if they differ in 
needs or disabling circumstances. Moreover, they may differ in preferences as well, which causes 
even more vexing problems for constructing comparable utility functions. 
   These conceptual problems cause inevitable difficulties for cost-benefit analysis. There are 
two standard ways of proceeding, assuming there is no consensus about the appropriate SWF to 
use. One procedure is to rank policy alternatives using a SWF with an explicit assumption about 
aversion to inequality, and to conduct sensitivity analysis with respect to the weights. In this 
way, the decision-maker can be given a menu of rankings depending on the weights used and be 4  R. Boadway / Public Policy Review 
responsible for choosing among them. For this purpose, it is typically convenient to roll the 
judgments about measurability of individual utility and aversion to inequality in utility into one, 
and apply the following SWF: 
() ( ) ∑ − =
−
i i n y y y y W σ
σ 1 / , , ,
1
2 1 L  (5) 
   The other procedure, most commonly used, is to ignore redistributive concerns and simple 
aggregate real income changes yen by yen regardless of to whom they accrue. This is the 
procedure advocated by Harberger (1971a), and is effectively equivalent to assuming the 
coefficient of aversion to income inequality  σ   in (5) is zero. Alternatively, if the SWF in (1) is 
used, the utilitarian form is assumed (so 0 = ρ ), and the individual utility function is assumed to 
be quasilinear in some consumption good (e.g.,  () ( ) n x x x g x x u , , , 2 1 0 L + = , so the marginal utility of 
income is constant. Though this procedure is most frequently used in practice, the general 
theoretical case for it is disputed in the literature unless one is prepared to assume  0 = σ .
2 The 
argument in favor relies on being able to separate efficiency and equity considerations in 
cost-benefit analysis.   
      Three sorts of arguments can be used for ignoring redistributive concerns. The first is related 
to the classic separation of efficiency and redistribution functions of government proposed by 
Musgrave (1959). The government has wide-ranging policy instruments available for 
redistribution, including the progressive tax system, transfer programs, social insurance and 
in-kind transfers. If it is using them effectively, equity consequences of other policies should be 
ignored, it being presumed that account will be taken of them elsewhere. Although this is a 
seductive argument, its limitations are evident. For one, the argument does not apply for policies 
that have explicit redistributive intent. For another, even if redistributive policies are set 
optimally, because these policies are distortionary, they cannot succeed in achieving the 
first-best social optimum. In these second-best circumstances, one cannot really ignore the 
redistributive consequences of policies except in special circumstances. The famous 
Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) production efficiency theorem indicates one such set of circumstances. 
If taxes are set optimally, there should be production efficiency in the economy, implying that 
the government should evaluate its own production plans according to the criterion of the value 
of output measured in producer prices. A similar argument can be adduced in evaluating projects 
i n v o l v i n g  t r a d e d  g o o d s :  t h e i r  s h a d o w  p r i c e s  s h o u l d  b e  w o r l d  p r i c e s  u n c o r r e c t e d  f o r  e q u i t y  
concerns (Boadway, 1976; Drèze and Stern, 1987).   
      The second argument is that if the aggregate change in real income is positive (∑ > 0 i y ), this 
indicates that those who gain from the policy should be able to compensate those who lose and 
still be better off. There are three problems with this hypothetical compensation argument. The 
first is that the compensation will not actually be paid, even if it hypothetically could be. In 
                                                                            
2  A comprehensive summary of the arguments against using this procedure may be found in Blackorby and 
Donaldson (1990).   R. Boadway / Public Policy Review 5 
these circumstances, ignoring equity consequences seems particularly arbitrary. Second, even if 
one accepts the hypothetical compensation criterion as a valid one, the aggregate change in real 
income turns out not to be a perfect indicator: positive aggregate real income changes need not 
be sufficient to satisfy the hypothetical compensation criterion (Boadway, 1974). Third, the 
hypothetical compensation criterion can take various forms depending on what one assumes to 
be the mechanism, and none of them yields a complete ordering of outcomes. 
   The third argument is that if there are many policies being undertaken over time, the 
redistributive consequences of them should roughly cancel out, so ignoring them for any one 
policy evaluation is innocuous. This is especially true if, following argument one, there are 
policies in place to address redistributive concerns. This argument seems to be no more 
convincing than the others.   
      Perhaps all these arguments are simply rationalizations for the more practical one. That is 
that it is very difficult to take account of the redistributive consequences of policies. Most often, 
only aggregate data that do not distinguish among individuals of different real income levels are 
available, so measuring aggregate real income changes is the only feasible procedure. This might 
be supplemented by some imperfect indication of the distributive consequences of the policy. 
Much of our discussion will focus on the use of real income measures of costs and benefits 
without redistributive weights explicitly incorporated. The general principles can best be 
illustrated this way. 
   Whatever view we take of the redistributive consequences of various policies, a basic 
ingredient is what we have referred to as the real income of individuals in the economy. To 
repeat, this is a money metric of utility (preference) levels of the household under different 
policies. Conceptually, in the simple case of utility in two goods, a money metric measure of 
utility change is the distance between two indifference curves measured in monetary terms. Of 
course, there are an indefinite number of ways of measuring the distance between two 
indifference curves, so the convention followed is to measure the distance using a budget line 
with given relative prices. Thus, our money metric utility measure is just the expenditure 
function: the value of expenditures required to reach a given indifference curve at some reference 
set of prices. It can be interpreted as the willingness to pay for the bundle of goods in a given 
situation. (This is a useful interpretation when it comes to evaluating non-marketed 
commodities as discussed later.) Of course, even this is not without ambiguity since the 
expenditure function differs according to the reference prices used. Two common examples 
when considering the effect of moving from policy ‘zero’ to policy ‘one’ are the compensating 
variation (CV) and equivalent variation (EV). The CV uses prices in the new situation to obtain 
a monetary measure of welfare change: 
() ()
0 1 1 1 , , CV u p e u p e − =  
where superscripts 1 and 0 refer to the prices and utilities after and before the change 6  R. Boadway / Public Policy Review 
respectively. Thus, 
1 p  represents the vector of prices of both goods demanded and factors 
supplied in the new situation, and  ()
1 1,u p e −   is the net expenditure required to achieve the utility 
level of the new situation at the prices 
1 p . Alternatively, the EV uses the old prices: 
() ()
0 0 1 0 , , EV u p e u p e − =  
In general, CV and EV will differ even though both are equally legitimate measures of changes in 
utility levels. More generally, any set of reference prices would serve as well. In principle, the 
choice of reference prices can have consequences for relative utility changes across households, 
for example, if they have different preferences for goods. But, in practice, given measurement 
problems that are likely to exist, any set of reference prices would serve as well. 
   Before leaving this section on the foundations, it is worth briefly turning to the practical 
issue of how one might incorporate distributive weights into cost-benefit analysis given the 
data constraints that are likely to apply. Distributive weights should take account of the fact 
that one yen of real income is of different social value to different individuals (e.g., Boadway, 
1976; Drèze and Stern, 1987; Ahmad and Stern, 1991). Suppose we take as given the coefficient of 
aversion to real income inequality,  σ , in the SWF given in (5). Then, changes in real income 











  (6) 
Note that (6) simplifies to 1 = i β   for the case where  0 = σ , so no welfare weights are used.  Apart 
from the issue of determining the correct value of  σ  to use, implementing (6) for evaluating 
policies is difficult since it will not generally be possible to attribute costs and benefits to 
individuals according to their real income levels. Often, only market-wide data will be available. 
There may be some exceptions. For example, wage payments for individual workers might be 
available in which case they could be weighted using i β , but generally that will not be possible 
for other cost items. 
   A less demanding procedure that has been proposed by Feldstein (1972b) in the context of 
public sector pricing is to assign social weights to commodities according to estimates of the 
proportions in which they are consumed by individuals with different real incomes. The 
procedure is as follows. From basic consumer theory, the change in individual i’s real income of 




















j x   is the demand for commodity j by individual i. Then, the change in real income from a 




j i dp x dy    R. Boadway / Public Policy Review 7 
Using this and (6), the change in social welfare from a change in consumer prices may be 
written: 
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ − = − = =
ii j j j j j j
i
j i i i dp X R dp x dy dW β β  (7) 
where  ∑ =
i
i










is defined as the distribution characteristic of good j. It is a weighted average of i β ’s, where the 
weights are the proportions of commodity i consumed by individual j. Given that  i β  falls  with 
real income, j R  will be higher for commodities with lower income elasticities of demand since 
these will be disproportionately consumer by lower income persons. More generally, costs and 
benefits of a policy can be weighted by their distributive characteristics in evaluating a policy 
(see Boadway, 1976). This is clearly a procedure that is less demanding empirically than 
calculating real income changes for each individual and weighting them by i β . 
   Consider, for example, the following illustrative application of the welfare effects of an 
excise tax, drawn from Harberger (1978). Given that the tax is on a single good, a partial 
equilibrium can be taken. Denote the aggregate output for the good simply by X, whose market 
is depicted in Figure 1. The imposition of a tax at the per unit rate t causes market output to fall 
from 0 X  to 1 X , and consumer price to rise from  0 p  to  1 p . If distributive effects were ignored, 
the standard measure of welfare loss would be the triangular area ABC, which is the difference 
between the losses in consumer and producer surplus (FABE and EBCD) and the gain in 
government revenue FACD. If distributive weights are attached to these losses and gains, the 
change in social welfare will be: 
FACD R EBCD R FABE R W G S D + − − = ∆  
where  D R ,  S R , and  G R   are the distributive characteristics associated with consumers surplus, 
producers surplus and government revenue, respectively. In the case of the first two, these 
reflect the shares of individuals of different income groups in the demand and supply of the good 
in question. The distributive weight on government revenue reflects the shares of government 
revenue raised from different income groups. In principle, this kind of methodology can be 
applied to any policy change. 
   F i n a l l y ,  b e f o r e  m o v i n g  t o  t h e  s p e c i f i c s  o f  c o s t -benefit analysis of policies, it is worth 
drawing special attention to the problems associated with evaluating the net benefits of projects, 
as opposed to fiscal policies. A natural question that arises is why we cannot simply use 
financial profitability measures such as are used in the private sector, and must instead rely on 
cost-benefit analysis. In other words, what are the sources of differences between social 
profitability and private profitability?   










p1 - t 
p1 




      The most fundamental differences arise because of the fact that in a second-best 
setting-when private markets are distorted-market prices typically deviate from social values. 
These distortions arise from several sources. One is that some markets may exhibit 
non-competitive behavior either on the supply or the demand sides. This arises because of the 
fact that scale economies lead to a relatively small number of market participants. In these 
circumstances, a distortion arises between the demand price (reflecting the marginal benefit) 
and the marginal cost. Another is that a commodity may emit an externality that accrues to third 
parties and that, if not priced, causes marginal social benefits to deviate from marginal social 
costs. Third, in some markets agents involved in transactions may be imperfectly informed about 
relevant characteristics or hidden actions of those on the other side of the market. Well-known 
examples include firms’ inability to observe either the productivity or the work effort of their 
employees, and consumers’ inability to observe the quality of products before they purchase 
them. This gives rise to inefficient market outcomes. Finally, government policies, such as taxes, 
subsidies and regulations, themselves introduce distortions in market economies. If these 
distortions must be taken as given by the analyst (even though in some cases, policies could be 
taken that might mitigate them), they will affect the evaluation of the net benefits of the project. 
As we shall see, one way to take market distortions into account is to devise ‘shadow prices’ to 
measure the social value of commodities sold on distorted markets rather than using the prices 
set on markets. This may be a difficult task because in many cases, the information needed to 
calculate shadow prices (such as the magnitude of externalities) may not be readily available 
from observed market data. 
   Related to this problem of evaluating project inputs and outputs when there markets are 
distorted is the fact that projects may have indirect effects on distorted markets elsewhere in   R. Boadway / Public Policy Review 9 
the economy. As emphasized by Harberger (1971a), if a market has a positive tax distortion, the 
amount transacted will be too low in equilibrium. Equivalently, the last unit sold will have a 
greater value to purchasers than to sellers. In these circumstances, if a project indirectly 
increases the output of this product because of complementarity relationships, there will be a 
net benefit on that account. This should be treated as a benefit of the project. 
   A third reason why private profitability might not adequately reflect social values is that 
some of the outputs produced or inputs used in a project may have no explicit market price 
attached to them. Examples include the benefits of new information produced by research and 
development, the value of time saved on a public transportation facility, the value of 
improvements in health and longevity, and the value of environmental amenities. Moreover, the 
government may decide to make the project’s output available free of charge, as might be the 
case with a recreation of transportation facility. Evaluating the benefits of any of these things 
involves resorting to techniques to elicit the willingness to pay for the benefits by households or 
firms.  
   Fourth, and related to the last case, projects undertaken by the public sector may not be 
financially self-sufficient but must rely on public funds to cover their costs. In a second-best 
economy, the costs of raising public revenue will involve a marginal deadweight loss from the 
distortions of the tax system. This will be the case whether tax or debt finance is involved. Note 
that this cost is over and above the value of resources used in the project. The two are often 
aggregated into a marginal cost of public funds (MCPF) that reflects the full cost of raising an 
additional yen of public revenues.
3  The excess burden of project financing must be included as a 
social cost of the project. Private profitability calculations ignore this cost. 
      Finally, projects are typically intertemporal in nature, so the benefits and costs occur over a 
number of periods. In arriving at a measure of the net benefit of the project, a discount rate must 
be used. The discount rate used on public projects-the social discount rate-may differ from the 
discount rate used for private projects. This will occur because of either distortions on capital 
markets (e.g., capital income taxes) or because of externalities associated with saving for future 
consumption, perhaps for heirs. Of course, to the extent that benefits or costs accrue to 
individuals of different generations or birth cohorts, additional equity issues would arise. How 
should we weigh real income changes of future generations relative to those of current 
generations? Should we discount them, or give them the same weight as in the static SWF of (5).   
      All of these issues will be taken into account in what follows. We begin with a discussion of 
the decision rule for aggregating project or policy costs and benefits, and then turn to the 
evaluation of the various elements of costs and benefits. 
 
                                                                            
3  On the MCPF, see Browning (1976), Wildasin (1984), Usher (1986) and Sandmo (1998). 10  R. Boadway / Public Policy Review 
II.  THE  DECISION  RULE 
 
   The ranking of projects involves aggregating the social benefits and costs into a single 
measure. In what follows, we neglect distributional weights and proceed by summing up all real 
income changes for individuals in the economy. In the absence of distributional weights, a yen’s 
worth of real income is worth the same to all individuals, which simplifies our analysis 
considerably. We can aggregate net benefits and costs without regard to whom they accrue. In 
an intertemporal context, the appropriate decision rule is the present value criterion. In the 
simplest case where the social discount rate is constant over time and denoted r, the present 












PV   (8) 
where Bt and Ct are the benefits and costs of the project in period t, which goes from 0 until the 
termination date of the project T. If this PV is positive, the project is socially profitable. More 
generally, policies can be ranked according to their PV, and that determines which one(s) should 
be undertaken.
4 
      Various choice situations are possible. If the choice is simply whether to undertake a given 
project, then the project should be undertaken if its PV is positive. If the policymaker is faced 
with a choice between two or more mutually exclusive projects or sets of projects, the one with 
the highest PV should be undertaken. These may be given types of projects of different scales, of 
different starting times, or of different lengths of life. A slightly more complicated case is when 
there is a fixed capital budget available to allocate to a chosen set of projects. In this case, the 
best option is the set of projects that satisfies the capital budget and has the highest summation 
of PVs. This may well involve excluding projects with higher PVs if, for example, they are 
relatively large in size. Care must be taken to include any welfare consequences of unused funds 
in evaluating among options. In particular, unused funds that revert to general revenues will 
avoid excess burdens of taxation that would otherwise arise. As well, care must be taken to 
account both for capital budgets that cover several periods, and for future capital expenditures 
that might be needed as the project continues over time. 
      There are some other specific issues that must be dealt with in applying PV formula (8). One 
has to do with the fact that when the project is expected to terminate at time T, there may well 
be some assets still on hand. Whatever scrap value they have must be treated as a benefit and 
evaluated appropriately. That evaluation may be problematic, depending on whether the 
                                                                            
4  There are alternatives to the PV that use the same basic information. One is the benefit-cost ratio, which 
is the ration of the PV of benefits to the PV of costs. While it will indicate whether a given project is 
worth undertaking, it can give a misleading ranking of mutually exclusive projects of different scales. 
Another is the internal-rate-of-return (IRR) criterion, which calculates the discount rate that makes 
the PV of benefits equal to the PV of costs. If the IRR exceeds the social discount rate, the project has a 
positive PV and is worth undertaking. However, the IRR may not be unique, and it may also rank 
mutually exclusive projects incorrectly if the time profile of benefits and costs differ.   R. Boadway / Public Policy Review 11 
terminal capital can be put to alternative uses. If so, the present value of its subsequent benefits 
must be estimated. There may also be some negative assets (future liabilities) at the terminal 
date. For example, there may be some site clearing requirements, if there are hazardous waste 
materials. The cost of disposing of these must be treated as a cost, assuming that the project is 
responsible for creating them in the first place. 
      A very important issue that must be decided is the unit of measurement of costs and benefits 
to be used in applying (8), or equivalently the numeraire. In principle, the choice of numeraire 
will not affect the ranking of projects, but it will give rise to numeraire-specific procedures for 
evaluating benefits and costs. The issue is complicated by the fact that markets are distorted, 
and some numeraire choices may themselves face distortions. As well, benefits and costs occur 
over time, and the measuring rod must take that into account. The standard approach is to use 
consumption in the present period as a numeraire, where consumption can be thought of as a 
composite of the consumption of all goods and services measured by the real income required to 
purchase them as discussed earlier. There are several conceptual issues that are involved in 
evaluating all benefits and costs in terms of current consumption, some of which involve 
converting benefits and costs into consumption in the current period, and others involving 
discounting benefits and costs accruing in different periods. 
     With respect to measuring benefits and costs in terms of consumption in any given period, 
several issues arise, which are treated in more detail in the following sections. The first is how 
to evaluate project inputs and outputs in terms of current consumption when these are traded 
domestically on distorted markets. As we shall see, shadow-pricing techniques can be used for 
this purpose. A special case is that of labor used on the project, given that labor markets not 
only face tax distortions, but may be characterized by unemployment and the adjustment costs 
associated with changing employment. Special techniques that exist for shadow pricing labor 
must be applied. Related to this in the evaluation of inputs and outputs for which there is no 
market price. Here shadow pricing involves estimating the willingness-to-pay for these items in 
terms of current consumption. A further issue is how to evaluate commodities that are traded so 
that their financial benefits or costs ultimately involve a supply or demand for foreign exchange. 
Here, the evaluation involves converting foreign exchange amounts to domestic consumption 
values using a shadow price of foreign exchange that takes account of distortions that might 
exist in foreign exchange markets. Next, projects or policies typically are not self-financing but 
have effects on government revenues. If there are distortions involved in raising revenues, a yen 
in the hands of the government will be worth more than a yen in the hands of consumers: the 
MCPF, which is the opportunity cost of converting a unit of consumer income to government 
revenue, will exceed unity. This premium on government revenues must be accounted for in 
evaluating the benefits and costs of the project in terms of current consumption. Finally, if 
distributional considerations are an issue, the value of current consumption will differ according 
to whom it accrues. One approach that can be taken is to treat as the numeraire consumption in 12  R. Boadway / Public Policy Review 
the hands of a given income class, such as the lowest. Then, to the extent that benefits accrue to 
individuals in other income classes, those must be discounted using the relative values of  i β  
defined above. Of course, it may well be decided to avoid incorporating distributional concerns 
directly into the analysis, and reporting distributional effects separately instead. 
   O n c e  i n -period benefits and costs have been estimated, they must be converted to current 
consumption values. The appropriate discount rate is the consumption discount rate, that is the 
rate at which individuals actually discount future versus present consumption. A number of 
issues arise here as well. An obvious one is the choice of discount rate. A natural candidate 
might be the after-tax interest rate faced by individuals in the economy. However, if there are 
externalities associated with saving (e.g., altruism toward future generations, or externalities 
associated with capital accumulation), these ought to be taken into account. Similarly, if capital 
market constraints restrict the ability of individuals to borrow and lend, or if there is 
uncertainty about the future that cannot be shed on capital markets, market interest rates may 
not reflect true consumption discount rates. Another issue is that projects may affect the level of 
investment elsewhere in the economy. If, for example, some investments are crowded out, the 
opportunity cost of that will be the present value of forgone consumption that would have been 
generated by the investment, which in the presence of capital market distortions, will be greater 
than  one per yen of forgone investment. The crowding out of private investment may come about 
from the way a project is financed, for example, whether by tax or debt finance. Finally, to the 
extent that the consumption of future generations is affected, the question arises as to what 
weight should be attributed to it when evaluated against current consumption. In other words, 
what distributive weight should be attached to the consumption of future generations. This will 
be important with respect to long-lived projects as well as with respect to fiscal policy changes 
that have intergenerational impacts, such as major tax reforms or reforms of social transfers. 
   Another issue that arises in aggregating benefits and costs over time is the manner of 
accounting for price level inflation. Here, what is important is consistency. Two alternative-and 
equivalent-procedures exist. One is to use nominal prices in each period, that is, the prices that 
obtain on markets. In this case, the discount rate that must be used is the nominal interest rate, 
which incorporates the effect of inflation. The other is to use constant-yen prices, which are 
obtained by deflating nominal prices by a price index that reflect the rate of inflation. Following 
either procedure will generate the same results. To see this, consider the PV formula given by (8). 
Suppose that benefits and costs are measured in nominal terms, and that the interest rate r is a 
nominal one. If the inflation rate is  π   per period (assumed constant here), converting nominal 
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As well, if we denote the real interest rate by i, it must satisfy: 
() () ( ) π + + = + 1 1 1 r i  













PV   (8′) 
Of course, either approach involves predicting values into the future, whether they be constant- 
or current-yen values. All cost-benefit analyses face this problem. 
   Some accounting issues also arise in the costing of capital inputs because of their durable 
nature. Their costs are incurred up front, but their use is spread over the future. Standard 
accounting principles suggest two alternative approaches to account for capital costs, cash-flow 
accounting and accrual accounting. Under cash-flow accounting, all outlays and inflows are 
costed as they occur. Capital expenditures are fully expensed when they are made. These 
include all investment expenditures - additions to a project’s capital stock, replacement and 
depreciation spending, and scrap value salvaged when the project terminates.  Costs of financing 
and ongoing depreciation are not included since that would be double counting, except to the 
extent that depreciated capital is replaced. 
      Accrual accounting costs capital as it is used rather than when it is acquired. Two costs are 
included, depreciation and financing costs. Depreciation includes the amount of capital value 
that is used up each period, and comprises obsolescence, wear and tear, and changes in the 
relatively price of the capital. Financing costs reflect the forgone interest associated with 
holding capital rather than investing the funds into financial assets.  
   Cash and accrual accounting for capital costs are alternative ways of presenting the same 
information, and ought not to be mixed: otherwise, double-counting or under-counting will 
occur. If properly done, the present value of the accrual costs of an investment should equal its 
cash flow. Accrual accounting is by its nature more difficult since it requires knowledge of 
depreciation, which cannot readily be observed from market prices. As well, the principles of 
shadow pricing discussed below are much less transparent under accrual accounting. Hence, 
cash accounting is typically used for cost-benefit analysis, contrary to the practice in the 
private sector. Accrual accounting is the norm for private firms since it conveys more 
information to shareholders of the current profitability of the firm. 
      The above discussion summarizes the issues that arise when current period consumption is 
chosen as the numeraire. Shadow prices for inputs purchases and outputs sold must take 
account of distortions on domestic markets; net foreign exchange earned from transactions 
involving tradables must be converted to consumption equivalents using a shadow price of 
foreign exchange; changes in government revenue must be converted to consumption equivalents 
using a MCPF; and future net benefits, including those affected by crowded-out investment, 14  R. Boadway / Public Policy Review 
must be discounted using a consumption discount rate. The result is the PV of a project 
measured in terms of consumption or real income of domestic individuals, with or without 
distributional considerations having been incorporated. 
      There are other options for the numeraire. One that has been prominent in the development 
literature is foreign exchange in the hand of the government. This was the choice proposed by 
Little and Mirrlees (1968), and developed further by Ray (1984). In this case, the value of all 
inputs and outputs are converted into equivalent values of foreign exchange using conversion 
factors that are analogous to the above shadow prices. Traded commodities can be evaluated at 
their foreign exchange costs (so-called world prices). Non-traded commodities are then converted 
into equivalent values in terms of foreign exchange using the inverse of a shadow price of foreign 
exchange. The use of this numeraire entails the use of analogous conversion factors as above, 
but the conversion is typically done in the reverse direction. Thus, any changes in output or use 
of non-traded commodities must be converted into foreign exchange using effectively the 
reciprocal of the shadow price of foreign exchange. Changes in domestic consumption changes 
are discounted relative to foreign exchange in the hand of the government because of the MCPF 
factor already mentioned. It was argued that this MCPF exceeds unity not just because of tax 
distortions, but also because in a developing country context, government funds might be an 
important source of finance for investment, which has higher value than consumption because of 
capital market distortions. The Little-Mirrlees approach also recommended incorporating 
distributional weights into the cost-benefit evaluation, it being the case that policy instruments 
were not as readily available in developing countries for addressing equity concerns directly. But 
in the end, nothing of real substance is involved in choosing between current consumption and 
foreign exchange in the hand of the government as the numeraire. If used consistently, both 
should yield the same project rankings.   
      In what follows, we follow the convention of taking current consumption as the numeraire. 
We take up some of the issues involved in measuring costs and benefits in terms of current 
consumption in more detail. 
 
III.  VALUING  MARKETABLE  INPUTS  AND  OUTPUTS 
 
   C o s t -benefit analysis involves putting social values on the net benefits of projects or policies 
in distorted economies. Before turning to the specific of particular types of costs and benefits, it 
is useful to put things into context by outlining a general expression for welfare change 
measures in a distorted economy. The expression we develop was proposed by Harberger (1971a), 
so we refer to it as Harberger’s measure of welfare change. It is a measure that ignores the distributive 
effects of policies, so we can base our discussion on an economy consisting of a representative 
household.  
   Let the representative consumer have a utility function  () n x , , x , x , x u L 2 1 0  where  i x  is the   R. Boadway / Public Policy Review 15 
consumer’s purchase of commodity i (which will be negative for factors supplied). The 
consumer’s price for commodity i is  i p , where  1 0 = p  for  the  numeraire  good  0 x . Differentiating 
the utility function and using the first-order conditions for the consumer’s utility maximization 
problem,  i i i p p / p u / u = = 0 0 , we obtain an expression for the change in utility from a change in 
consumption measured in terms of the numeraire good: 
∑ ∑ = = =
i i i i
o








   Next, suppose consumption is supplied from either the private market,  i y , or from public 
sector projects,  i z , so that market clearing implies  i i i z y x + = . Private sector production is 
implicitly determined by a transformation function  () 0 2 1 0 = n y . , y , y , y f L . Assuming there is 
production efficiency, the producer price for commodity i in terms of the numeraire good can be 
expressed as  i i i t p f / f − = 0 , where  i t   is the distortion in market i. We can think of this as a tax 
distortion, but it could also be an externality or a distortion due to monopoly power. 
Differentiating the transformation function, and using the expressions for relative producer 
prices, we obtain: 
() ∑ = −
i i i i dy t p 0  (10) 
      Then, combining (9) and (10) and using the market clearing condition, we obtain: 
() ∑ ∑ − + =
ii i i i i i dz t p dx t dw  (11) 
This is the general expression for the change in welfare arising from any small change in 
consumer demands and project production. The former are evaluated at the size of the distortion, 
while project inputs and outputs are evaluated at their producer prices. It is useful for what 
follows to recognize that projects will only operate in some markets. Let k index the markets on 
which a project under consideration operates and j index all other markets. Then, (11) may be 
written: 
() ∑ ∑ ∑ + − + =
j j j kk k k k k k dx t dz t p dx t dw  (12) 
Thus, if we are evaluating a project that involves a change in the  k z ’s, (12) indicates that we 
must take account of the direct opportunity cost of the project’s inputs and outputs, indirect 
changes in welfare on the markets on which those inputs and outputs are traded and welfare 
changes in other markets. In the following we first consider first the welfare effects arising from 
changes in outputs on the markets in which the project operates-the first two terms in (12)-and 
then the indirect effects-the third term. We then look at issues that arise in particular markets. 
 
III.1.    DIRECT WELFARE EFFECTS ON MARKET INPUTS AND OUTPUTS 
 
   We consider here the welfare effects associated with the purchase of a commodity on a 16  R. Boadway / Public Policy Review 
distorted market, where the welfare effect includes both the value of the resources transferred to 
the public sector and changes in the cost of the distortion itself. The technique used is to 
construct a shadow price that takes account of both of these effects. In terms of the general 
welfare change measure (12), the effect of a change in the output of a commodity  k z  by a 
project can be expressed as: 
43 42 1 4 43 4 42 1

























   Here we consider what is labeled the direct effect, which we can think of as the shadow 
price of commodity k, denoted  k s . We can obtain a simplified expression for this shadow price 
by adopting a partial equilibrium approach and supposing that market supplies and demands 
depend only on own-prices. Then, the market clearing condition can be written 


































Then, since  k k k k k z / p ' x z / x ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ , the shadow price of  k z  (corresponding to the direct effect 
above) is: 
()
' x ' y
' x p ' y t p
s
k k
k k k k k
k −
− −
=  (14) 
This is known as Harberger’s shadow pricing rule, following Harberger (1969). It stipulates that 
the shadow price is a weighted average of the supply and demand prices, where the weights are 
the proportions in which an increase in  k z   comes from increased supply and reduced demand. 



















− =  (15) 
      To illustrate the meaning of this shadow price, refer to Figure 2. Suppose before the project 
is introduced, market output is 
0 0
k k y x = , with the associated consumer price 
0
k p  and producer 
price  k k t p −
0 . The project demand is  k z ∆ , which causes supply to rise to 
1
k y   and demand to fall 
to 
1
k x . The opportunity cost of the project demand consists of loss in value to consumers of the 
area beneath the demand curve  k k k k x p abx x ∆
0 0 1 − ≅ , while the opportunity cost to producers is the 
relevant area under the supply curve  () k k k k k y t p cdy y ∆ − ≅
0 1 0 . Thus, the opportunity cost per unit of 
k z , that is, its shadow price, is given by (15). Notice that if the supply curve is horizontal, the 
shadow price is the supply price  k k t p − , while if the demand curve is horizontal, the shadow 
price is the demand price  k p . The former case might be thought to be relevant where the 
commodity is tradable and the supply price is dictated by the world price. However, in this case, 
an increment in project supply results in an increment of foreign exchange earnings. To the 
extent that there are distortions in trade (tariffs, ex post subsides, quotas, etc.), the conversion 
                                                                            
5  If distribution is an issue, the weights in this shadow pricing rule could be augmented by distributive 
weights in a manner discussed earlier.   R. Boadway / Public Policy Review 17 
of foreign exchange earnings to domestic consumption values will itself involve some shadow 
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III.2.    INDIRECT WELFARE EFFECTS ON RELATED MARKETS 
 
   To the extent that the change in project demand for commodity k induces changes in the 
market output of commodities in other distorted markets, an indirect welfare effect must be 
taken into account. This indirect effect is captured in the last term in (13), which can be 










  (16) 
The ‘augmented shadow price’ of  k z  would then be the sum of the direct and indirect effects, 
k k r s + , where  k s   is given by (15). 
      This indirect effect can be depicted geometrically for the case of one of the related markets 
in Figure 3. Here, the market for the related commodity  j x   has a negative distortion, so  0 < j t . 
This could be a subsidy or a negative externality causing the marginal value to consumers to be 
less than the marginal cost on the supply side (the marginal social cost in the case of an 
externality). In the initial equilibrium without the project in place, output is 
0
j x  and demand 
and supply prices are 
0
j p  and 
0 0
j j j p t p > − , respectively. The marginal distortion-the difference 
between the opportunity cost to suppliers and the value to demanders-is given by  j t . Since the 
marginal distortion is constant, the welfare gain from any change in  j x  is given by  j j x t ∆ , as 
(16) implies. In Figure 3, the supply price is assumed to be constant for simplicity, and the 
change in project demand  k z ∆   is assumed to cause the demand curve for  j x   to shift right. Thus, 18  R. Boadway / Public Policy Review 
if  0 > k z ∆ , so  0 < k x ∆ , it would be the case that  0 > j x ∆   if the two commodities were substitutes 
in demand. The equilibrium output of good j rises to 
1
j x . The welfare change in the market for 
j x  consists of two components: the increase in the costs of providing the extra  j x  given by 
area 
1 0
j jbcx x  and the increase in the value of the additions output to consumers, 
1 0
j jadx x . The 
difference between these is the area abcd, which corresponds with the indirect effect  j j x t ∆  that 
appears in (16), in this case an additional welfare cost. The augmented shadow price would have 
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      Indirect effects of this sort have been important in the evaluation of transportation projects, 
such as a subway system, an airport, or a major bridge or tunnel. One of the main effects of these 
kinds of projects, in addition to creating new demand, is to divert traffic from other modes of 
transport, and often these other forms have distorted prices. For example, public transport 
projects may divert traffic from road travel, where price (the cost of a trip on the road) will be 
less than social cost, which includes the congestion imposed on other travelers. In this case, the 
indirect effect would be a benefit associated with the reduction in traffic on congested roadways. 
These indirect benefits can be among the most important benefits of transportation projects. 
Moreover, the existence of indirect benefits arising from diverted traffic can lead to arguments 
for subsidizing public transit usage as a way of increasing the amount of traffic diverted. This is 
a classic second-best pricing argument. 
 
III.3.    SHADOW PRICING OF PARTICULAR INPUTS 
 
      The above discussion of the shadow pricing of inputs and outputs applies in general to any   R. Boadway / Public Policy Review 19 
commodities. There are a few special examples that tend to be of particular importance. Here, 
we consider two special cases: labor and foreign exchange. When we turn to intertemporal 
issues below, the weighted average methodology will reappear. 
 
III.3.1.  The  Shadow  Wage  Rate 
 
      Virtually all projects employ labor as a major input, and labor markets are typically distorted. 
Taxes of various sorts-both direct and indirect-will drive a wedge between the price firms pay 
workers and the after-tax wage that workers receive. There may also be unemployment in labor 
markets, and there may be rigidities that preclude costless movement of labor from one location 
or occupation to another. Shadow pricing of labor should take all these factors into account.   
   If the only distortion were taxation, the weighted-average principle would apply directly. 
The shadow wage rate would be a weighted average of the before-tax wage rate and the 
after-tax wage rate, where the weights are the proportions in which the project labor comes 
from workers previously employed elsewhere (forgone demand) and workers induced to enter 
the labor force (increased supply).   
     More generally, where there are other sources of distortions, these would need to be taken 
into account. Begin with the case of involuntary unemployment. If this exists, workers hired by 
a project can come from three sources: those who would be employed elsewhere, those who are 
attracted into the workforce from voluntary unemployment, and those who are involuntarily 
unemployed. The shadow wage will be a weighted average of the opportunity cost of each of 
these. In the case of workers employed elsewhere, the opportunity cost is the before-tax wage 
rate, and for those voluntarily unemployed, it is the after-tax wage rate, as above. For the 
involuntarily unemployed, they would have been willing to work for the going wage rate but are 
unable to find a job. Their opportunity cost is less that the after-tax wage rate (since they 
would be willing to work at the going wage), but greater than the value of leisure (discussed 
further below). Since the true opportunity costs differs for different workers, and since it is not 
observed on the market, some arbitrary choice must be made, perhaps midway between the 
before-tax wage and an estimated value of leisure time, which is presumably above zero. 
   Matters are more complicated once one takes account of the fact that involuntary 
unemployment might be an equilibrium phenomenon. Consider the following simple example, 
taken from the literature on cost-benefit analysis in a developing country context. Suppose 
there are two sectors in the economy, a rural one and an urban one, and a wage differential 
exists between them. In particular, the urban wage rate  u w  exceeds the rural wage,  r w . There 
might, for example, by severe underemployment in the rural sector because of, say, technological 
improvement making labor redundant, but nonetheless families continue to employ family 
members at subsistence wage rates. A naïve application of shadow pricing might take the 
s h a d o w  w a g e  r a t e  t o  b e  a  w e i g h t e d  a v e r a g e  o f   u w  and  r w , with the weights being the 20  R. Boadway / Public Policy Review 
proportion of workers for a project drawn from the urban and rural sectors. Given 
underemployment in the rural sector, the latter may be close to zero, as observed by Dasgupta, 
Marglin and Sen (1972) and Little and Mirrlees (1974). 
      However, the persistence of the differential between  u w  and  r w  might  reflect  an 
equilibrium of sorts in the labor market, in which case the simple shadow pricing rule must be 
amended. One form the equilibrium might take has been proposed by Harris and Todaro (1970), 
and used by Harberger (1971b) to derive the shadow price. Suppose that  u w   is above the market 
clearing level for some institutional reasons (for example, efficiency wages, turnover costs, etc.). 
This leads to an unemployment rate denoted byπ . If jobs are allocated randomly to the 
unemployed, if workers are risk-neutral, and if there are no costs of migration, workers will 
allocate themselves between the urban and rural sectors until the expected wage is equalized, 
or u r w w π = . Consider now a project that creates jobs in the urban sector. Each job that is filled 
will cause  π / 1   workers to migrate to the urban sector to maintain equilibrium. The 
opportunity cost of these workers is π / r w , or equivalently,  u w . So the shadow wage rate is just 
the wage actually paid to hire them: no weighted average shadow price is required. The same 
argument can be seen to apply if the project is in the rural sector. The shadow wage would then 
be r w .  
      Of course, this procedure would have to be suitably amended if there were other distortions, 
like taxes and subsidies, or if distributional concerns were included in the shadow wage. 
However, note that migration costs would not affect the argument. If migration costs were m per 
worker, labor market equilibrium would be  u r w m w π = +  (assuming migration is from the rural 
to the urban sector). Now the opportunity cost of each worker attracted to the urban sector 
would be  m wr + . Again, each urban job created would attract  π / 1  workers,  whose  opportunity 
costs is  ()u r w m w = + π / . Thus, the shadow wage rate again equals the wage rate actually paid. 
 
III.3.2.  The  Shadow  Exchange  Rate 
 
   Suppose now that a project input is a tradable commodity whose world price is taken as 
given from this country’s point of view. Any project demand will result in an increase in the 
demand for foreign exchange. Suppose that trade is distorted by trade taxes (import tariffs or 
export taxes). To begin with, and to illustrate the point, suppose that all imports face a common 
tariff rateτ . Given that the world prices are fixed, we can think of aggregating all traded 
commodities into a composite commodity, which we can simply refer to as foreign exchange, 
whose price is e, the exchange rate. The quantity of exports consists of the amount that can be 
sold for one unit of foreign currency. The supply curve for exports is then the supply curve of 
foreign exchange as a function of the exchange rate, denoted  () e S . It will be an upward-sloping 
curve: the greater the price of foreign currency, the greater the value in the domestic currency 
per unit of exports, and therefore the greater the supply of exports by domestic producers. The   R. Boadway / Public Policy Review 21 
domestic price of composite imports will be  () e τ + 1 , since all imports bear a common tariff. Then, 
the domestic demand curve for important will be  () () e D τ + 1 , which will be downward sloping. 
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where  e z ∆  is the net demand for foreign exchange by the project. A geometric interpretation 
analogous to that in Figure 2 applies directly. Notice that the shadow price of foreign exchange 
typically exceeds the market exchange rate,  e se > . Thus, a cost-benefit analysis will discourage 
the use of traded commodities. 
   The analysis can readily be extended to the case where there are different tariff rates on 
different commodities. Suppose the tariff rate i τ  applies to import i, whose demand is i D . The 


















The case of export taxes could also be included. Moreover, the shadow price of foreign exchange 
could in principle incorporate other distortions in trade, such as quotas or exchange rates that 
were out of equilibrium due to being less than completely flexible.   
 
IV.    THE EXCESS BURDEN OF PROJECT FINANCING 
 
   A typical feature of public projects is that they are not self-financing. Their costs will be 
financed either by taxes or borrowing (future taxes). In either case, there are welfare costs 
associated with them that must be taken into account in evaluating projects. Since somewhat 
separate issues arise with respect to taxation and borrowing, we consider them in turn. To the 
extent that there is an excess burden arising from project financing, that excess burden must be 
treated as a cost over and above the shadow pricing of costs that we have already discussed. 
Note, however, that only the excess burden must be included, not the full cost of the financing. 
Nonetheless, the methodology outlined below discusses the full costs of financing, both the 
resources transferred to the project and the excess burden. Care must be taken not to double 
count the costs. 
 
IV.1.    THE COSTS OF TAXATION: THE MARGINAL COST OF PUBLIC FUNDS 
 
   If a project is financed by taxation, the cost of finance is the opportunity costs of raising 
additional revenues in an already distorted economy. Consider the following simple partial 
equilibrium model to illustrate the point. The utility function of the representative household is 
() ( ) ( ) z b h c z c u + − + = l l 1 , , , where c is composite consumption,  l is labor supplied and z is the 
project output. The function  () l − 1 h   is the utility of leisure (assuming households have one unit 22  R. Boadway / Public Policy Review 
of time to allocate to leisure and work), and is increasing and strictly concave. The wage rate is 
w, and government imposes a tax at the rate t on labor, assumed for simplicity to be a per unit 
tax. Thus, the household, taking t and z as given, solves the following problem: 
()( ) ( )
l
l l z b h t w ＋ － ＋ － 1 Max  
The first-order condition is  () t w h − = − ′ l 1 , which yields the labor supply function  () t w− l . The 
value function for this problem is the indirect utility function  () z t w v , − , which has the following 
properties by the envelope theorem: 
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≡     , l  (17) 
Using this, we can obtain an expression for welfare change by differentiating the indirect utility 
function to give: 
() dz z b dt dz v dt v dv z t ′ + − = + = l  
Feasible changes in t and z must satisfy the government budget constraint:  () z t w t = − l . 
Differentiating this we obtain  () l l ′ − = t dz dt / , so the expression for welfare change may be 
written: 
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Where  () l l / ′ − = t w ε   is the elasticity of labor supply and  () t w t − = / τ   is the ad valorem labor tax 
rate. The term  ()
1 1
− −τε   is the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF). The cost-benefit analysis 
rule (18) says that the net benefit of the project consists of its benefits less its costs, where the 
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   The MCPF can be given a geometric interpretation. Figure 4 depicts the labor market with 
the pre-tax wage assumed to be fixed and the labor supply curve upward sloping. In the initial 
situation, the after-tax wage is 
0 t w−   and labor supply is 
0 l . When the tax is increased to 
1 t , 
labor supply falls to 
1 l . The MCPF is the total cost per unit of revenue raised. The increment of 
revenue raised from the tax increase is  A B − . The cost is the value of resources transferred, 
A B − , plus the increase in deadweight loss, which is approximately A, for a total of B. Thus, the 
MCPF is: 
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Of course, if there are many different taxes in place, the MCPF expression becomes 
correspondingly more complicated. 
 
IV.2.    THE OPPORTUNITY COST OF BORROWED FUNDS 
 
     Now consider the case in which some project financing comes from borrowing. If there are 
distortions in capital markets, that will affect the opportunity cost of the borrowing. Suppose 
the rate of return on investment, denotedρ , exceeds the after-tax return on saving, denoted r, 
because of taxes levied on capital income. These could include both personal taxes and taxes on 
firms, and we aggregate them into a single tax rate t. (At this point we assume that the economy 
is closed, a point to which we return below.)   
   Figure 5 can be used to illustrate the effects of borrowing an amount  B ∆ . The demand for 
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depends on r, is the curve S. The project finance shifts the demand curve to the right, displacing 
some private demand,  D ∆ , and inducing some additional supply,  S ∆ . The opportunity cost of 
these changes constitutes the opportunity cost of borrowing. 
   Following Marglin (1963) and Feldstein (1972a), the increment of saving corresponds with 
forgone consumption, so its opportunity cost is simply the amount saved S ∆ . The opportunity 
cost of the forgone investment is the stream of output the investment would have yielded. If the 
future output would have been consumed, the evaluation of the opportunity cost is 
straightforward. With a rate of return on investment given by  ρ , the return is equivalent to a 
perpetual stream of output  ρ , which has a present value of  1 / > r ρ . If all returns to investment 
are consumed, this is the present value of the stream of forgone consumption from the displaced 












MCB  (19) 
Thus, for every yen of borrowing,  1 MCB−   would have to be added as the excess burden arising 
from debt finance. Conversely, when the debt is paid down, the reduction in excess burden 
remaining would have to be deducted (although this may well be offset by an increase in the 
excess burden of taxation that is used to repay the debt).   
      The simplicity of (19) is due to the assumption that all investment returns are consumed. If 
some of them are reinvested, the benefits of that in terms of the stream of consumption 
generated would have to be taken into account. For example, suppose that a fixed proportion 
σ of project returns are reinvested at the rate of returnρ . Then, the capital value of one yen of 
initial investment will grow at the rate  σρ   per period. Assuming continuous time for simplicity, 
the asset value will be 
t σρ e  at  time  t, which will generate  ()
t σρ σ e 1−   in consumption. In this case, 
the present value of consumption generated by an initial yen of investment will be 

















Other illustrative examples could be considered, but the principles are clear. 
   The above discussion of the size of the MCB was for the (unrealistic) case of a closed 
economy. In reality, capital markets are open, and many countries might face highly elastic 
supplies of international savings, so the cost of borrowing is effectively fixed. This complicates 
the determination of the MCB slightly since now there are three sources of project borrowing: 
forgone domestic investment, increased domestic saving and foreign lending. Different 
distortions might apply to different sources. A tax on investment will imply that the 
opportunity cost of forgone investment will exceed unity for the same reasons as discussed 
above. If there is a tax on savings, there will be a further distortion on domestic investment as 
well as a distortion on capital inflows. The opportunity cost in terms of domestic consumption 
will exceed one on this account. Moreover, there will also be a requirement to shadow price any   R. Boadway / Public Policy Review 25 
foreign exchange that is used to finance project borrowing. 
   It should be noted that in the literature, other ways of taking account of capital market 
distortions have been proposed. A well-known one is that proposed by Harberger (1969). He 
suggests using a weighted-average discount rate to take account of capital market distortions, 
rather than to treat the excess burden of those distortions as a cost of the project itself. The 
discount rate used in the PV formula (8) would be a weighted average ofρ  and r, where the 
weights are the proportions of project financing coming from forgone investment and increased 
savings. This method will not generally give the same project rankings as the MCB method 
described above. For further discussion of this, see Feldstein (1972a), Boadway (1978), and 
Boadway and Bruce (1984). 
 
V.  NON-MARKETED INPUTS AND OUTPUTS 
 
   Some project outputs may be of the nature of services or benefits that accrue free of cost 
rather than being subject to market transactions. Transportation projects may save travel time 
or reduce environmental degradation; research expenditures produce new knowledge that is 
freely available to individuals and firms; health expenditures may reduce the incidence of disease 
and loss of life; environmental expenditures may improve amenities in forests and parks; and 
education and training programs may improve skills of participants. Since no prices are available 
to guide the evaluator, some other method must be used to attribute values to these 
non-marketed or intangible benefits (or costs). The principle is straightforward: benefits should 
be valued at the willingness-to-pay, that is the amount of consumption or real income that 
households would be willing to forgo in order to receive the benefits.   
      In the absence of market prices, other means must be used to infer willingness-to-pay. The 
procedure used will vary according to the nature of the non-marketed benefit. In some cases, 
indirect evidence of pricing elsewhere may be used. For location-specific benefits, the effect of 
the project on property values may be used. In some cases, hedonic pricing methods can be used, 
where households’ behavior in other contexts may be used to infer the value of an item. Finally, 
survey techniques can be used to ask households anonymously what value they place on an item, 
taking care to ensure that the survey not affect their incentive to misreport. We proceed by 
considering various examples that are commonly found in practice. 
 
V.1.    The Value of Lives Saved 
 
      Many public projects have as one of their effects a reduction in lives lost, or more generally, 
improvements in safety of various sorts. This is sometimes misleadingly referred to as ‘the value 
of life’. From the point of view of the users, it is more accurate to view it as the value of a 
reduction in the risk of death. Since there are many examples elsewhere of households having to 26  R. Boadway / Public Policy Review 
choose among options that involve different risks of death, it is natural to use hedonic pricing 
techniques to infer what they might be willing to pay to reduce the risk of death (or injury).   
   The monetary value to be attached to a reduction in the risk of death or injury should in 
principle be the willingness-to-pay for such a reduction by the households potentially involved. 
Note that this approach involves estimating an ex ante willingness-to-pay for reducing the risk 
of death, rather than evaluating the willingness-to-pay for eliminating the certainty of dying. 
Presumably the latter would be indefinitely high.
6  For public projects, this might be regarded as 
inappropriate. It would be known with some degree of certainty how many lives will be saved by, 
say, road safety improvements even if it is not known precisely whose lives will be saved. Thus, 
some might argue that using the willingness-to-pay as an ex ante measure of the value of a 
reduced risk of death may not be appropriate. In any case, some account must be taken of the 
reduction of lives lost, and we adopt the common approach of evaluating that as an ex ante 
willingness-to-pay. 
   If one takes this approach, it may not be necessary to value the willingness-to-pay 
explicitly: it may be implicitly taken account of to the extent that households can voluntarily 
choose to use the project. For example, if a new highway or an improvement to an existing one 
reduces the risk of accident, the value of that reduction is implicit in the demand curve for the 
use of the highway. It measures the marginal values placed on highway use net of the costs, 
which include the risk of injury as well as other intangible costs like the saving of time (to be 
discussed next). 
      Where an explicit estimate must be made of the reduction in the risk of death, the procedure 
is to infer it from other situations in which households must choose among alternatives that 
involve different risks of death. One such situation is the choice of workers among jobs with 
different probabilities of dying on the job (e.g., mining versus bookkeeping). With the 
appropriate data, econometric techniques can in principle be used to estimate the amount of 
money persons need to be compensated for to accept an increase in the risk of death. Of course, 
it may be difficult empirically to disaggregate wage differentials into various factors including 
the risk of death on the job. As well, persons may differ according the their ‘risk aversion’ for 
death, so the differential attributed to high-risk jobs might underestimate the average cost of 
the risk of death. Less risk-averse persons will gravitate towards higher risk jobs, and the 
differential needed to compensate them will be less than average. 
 
V.2.    Value of Time Saved   
 
   The construction of transportation facilities including subways, expressways, airports, 
                                                                            
6  Actually, income effects are important here. The amount one would be willing to pay to avoid losing 
one’s life would be less than the amount they would be accept to accept losing their life. The former is 
limited by the wealth they have. For a general discussion of evaluating lives saved, see Jones-Lee (1976).   R. Boadway / Public Policy Review 27 
tunnels and bridges are done to facilitate the movement of people and goods from one place to 
another in a timely fashion. Some of the traffic they attract is newly generated, while some is 
diverted from other means, at least partly to reduce travel time and increase convenience and 
comfort. In evaluating these projects, the benefits of time saved as well as comfort and 
convenience must be attributed. We focus on time saved, but similar techniques can be used for 
comfort and convenience.
7 
   As with shadow pricing procedures outline above, the value of time saved in traveling 
depends upon the alternative uses to which the saved time will be put. It may simply allow more 
leisure time to travelers, or it may be used for productive work. In the latter case, valuation is in 
principle straightforward. To the extent that working time and travel time are perfect 
substitutes, and wages correctly reflect productivity, the value of time saved can be estimated 
using wage rates.   
      If time saved is devoted to leisure, matters are more complicated. One might imagine that a 
household attributes different values to working time, MBW, leisure time, MBL, and commuting 
time, MBC. While commuting time might be fixed to the household, the division of the remainder 
of time between working and leisure would be done so as the marginal values of each activity are 
the same: MBL = w + MBW, where w is the wage rate. This implies that MBL < MBL. If the project 
increases leisure time, the value of time saved is then V = MBL - MBC. Since V cannot be observed 
directly, it must be inferred. The hedonic approach would be to do so by observing how much 
people are willing to pay to save time in other contexts where such choices are available. For 
example, there may be circumstances in which people have a choice between using different 
modes of transport to travel to and from given destinations. Data of these sorts can be used to 
estimate the value of time saved traveling. This can be used to value time saved traveling by 
traffic that is diverted from other modes of transport. For newly generated traffic, the value of 
time is implicit in the estimate of demand curves for new traffic, to the extent that those can be 
estimated. (This is analogous to the values of reductions in the risk of death by voluntary project 
users discussed above.) 
   Similar techniques can be used to estimate improvements in comfort and convenience 
associated with new or improved transportation facilities. They can also be used to estimate the 
benefits of other investment, such as recreational facilities, where access to the facilities takes 
time. The value of using these facilities can be estimated by using, among other things, the 
amount of time households are willing to take to gain access to them. 
 
V.3.  Costs  of  Pollution   
 
   Projects that are specific to a given location might impose pollution costs on neighboring 
                                                                            
7  A good outline of the issues may be found in Harrison and Quarmby (1972). 28  R. Boadway / Public Policy Review 
residents. An airport will increase noise levels in the vicinity. An industrial project may cause 
air pollution. Estimates of the cost of such pollution might be obtained indirectly from property 
values. The costs of pollution should be capitalized into residential property values. Empirically, 
hedonic pricing techniques can in principle be used to obtain monetary measures of the costs of 
pollution. As before, data would have to be sufficient and care would have to be taken to ensure 
that one could estimate the effect of the pollution on property values, separate from the other 
things that determine them. But the principles are clear. 
 
V.4.  Contingent  Valuation   
 
      A major problem with estimating the effects of intangibles using hedonic pricing techniques, 
whether it be the value of reductions in the risk of injury and death, the value of time saved or 
comfort and convenience or the cost of pollution, is that sufficient data may not be available to 
obtain reliable estimates. In these circumstances, survey methods might be used to generate 
suitable data. Instead of relying on observed choices to estimate the value of non-marketed 
benefits and costs, households could be asked to reveal them directly through a survey. The 
survey could ask how much households are willing to pay for the intangible in question or, 
alternatively, how much they would be willing to accept to give up some intangible benefit or to 
accept some cost. To the extent that the survey was complete and households responded 
truthfully, this would yield estimates of their willingness-to-pay. 
   The survey would have to be designed to ensure that respondents fully understand the 
nature of the intangible being evaluated. Those who are surveyed must include a representative 
sample of those who affected by the project. As well, those who voluntarily accept to fill in a 
survey must not represent a biased group, such as those who feel most strongly about it. And, as 
mentioned, responses must be truthful. Those who feel strongly about an issue will have an 
incentive to exaggerate their willingness-to-pay. As with hedonic pricing techniques, 
contingent valuation methods must be used and interpreted with due care. 
      We now turn in the final sections to issues that arise in an intertemporal context.   
 
VI.  THE  SOCIAL  DISCOUNT  RATE 
 
   The flow of benefits and costs will be measured in terms of the numeraire in each period. 
Presuming the numeraire is the value of consumption, the appropriate rate for discounting 
future net benefits to the present is a consumption rate of interest. Given our assumption that it 
is the willingness-to-pay of households that determines project benefits and costs, the 
appropriate rate of discount for aggregating benefits and costs over time is the rate at which 
households discount present versus future consumption. If we set aside equity considerations 
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suppose that the discount rate for public projects-the social discount rate-is the interest rate at 
which households could borrow and lend. This would be the case if capital markets were perfect, 
if all households faced the same interest rate, and if there were no externalities arising from 
household saving. The common interest rate would be the rate at which households themselves 
discount future versus present consumption. If there are taxes on capital income, the 
appropriate consumption discount rate would be the after-tax return that households obtain on 
their savings (or pay on their borrowing). 
      If one or more of these assumptions are not met, the determination of the social discount rate 
will be more complicated. Some of the more important ones are considered in what follows. 
 
VI.1.    Heterogenous Household Discount Rates 
 
   There are many reasons why the rate used by different households to discount future 
consumption may differ. Even if there were no constraints on borrowing or lending, after-tax 
interest rates will differ if the tax system is progressive or if different types of assets face 
different tax rates, both of which are common in practice. As well, because of costs of 
intermediation, borrowing and lending rates may differ. Finally, if capital markets are imperfect, 
households may be restricted in the amounts they can borrow, and the terms on which they can 
borrow may differ according to their incomes or wealth. If there are liquidity constraints, 
household borrowing will be rationed, implying that their discount rate will be higher than the 
market interest rate. Finally, capital markets may not be perfectly competitive, and they may be 
plagued by problems of asymmetric information.   
   In all these circumstances, there is no unique consumption discount rate. Since it is 
impractical to disaggregate project benefits and costs by household type, in practice some 
compromise discount rate must be used, such as an average of after-tax returns to saving. 
 
VI.2.  Saving  Externalities 
 
   Saving may be done for various reasons. One is to smooth consumption out over one’s 
lifetime. Another might be to pass on some of one’s wealth to one’s heirs. Yet another may be for 
precautionary purposes, such as to self-insure against uncertainty in the length of life or one’s 
future health. In all these cases, there may be external benefits generated for third parties from 
whom no compensation is received.   
      One source of externalities is associated with the investment that savings are used to finance. 
To the extent that investment provides benefits to society at large, such as through the 
generation of new knowledge or the accumulation of skills through experience, the future 
consumption generated from one’s savings will be greater than one obtains oneself. In these 
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argument for policies that encourage savings. It is not at all obvious that this has implications 
for the social discount rate, however. Unless the project in question actually influences the 
incentive that households have to save, the appropriate rate for discounting future consumption 
should be the rate at which consumers actually do use, which is the after-tax interest rate. If the 
project stimulates saving, the external benefits of that saving could be taken into account as an 
extra benefit of the project. 
      Similar arguments apply to other sources of externalities associated with saving. In the case 
of saving for bequests, whether intentionally or unintentionally, external benefits may accrue to 
households to the extent that they have an altruistic regard for the well-being of future 
generations. Savings for bequests will take the form of a public good that generates benefits 
simultaneously for many members of the current generation. Because of the free-rider problem 
associated with altruism, private saving will tend to me too small on efficiency grounds. As in 
the case of investment externalities, there will be a case for government intervention to 
encourage saving for future generations. However, it is not clear that this should affect the 
social discount rate used for cost-benefit analysis. Unless the project actually encourages (or 
discourages) saving, no external effect will be created, and the appropriate discount rate is the 
one that households actually use. 
   Households may under-save for other reasons. They may simply be myopic. Or, as 
emphasized in recent literature, their preferences may be time-inconsistent (Laibson, 1997). 
T h i s  k i n d  o f  b e h a v i o r  p o s e s  r e a l  p r o b l e m s  f o r  c o s t -benefit analysis since it implies that 
households are either irrational or otherwise end up regretting their saving choices. It is not at 
all obvious how a cost-benefit analysis methodology that is built on the foundations of 
welfarism and non-paternalism can be revised to take account of behavior that seems to 
contradict the household’s own self-interest. This remains an open research question. 
      The above argument in favor of using the after-tax interest rate as the social discount rate is 
based on the assumption that the numeraire being used for cost-benefit analysis is current 
consumption. If another numeraire is used, a different discount rate will generally be required. 
For example, the numeraire proposed by Little and Mirrlees (1974) and often used by the World 
Bank is foreign exchange in the hand of the government. The discount rate should then be the 
relative value of future versus present foreign exchange held by the government. Little and 
Mirrlees (1974) argue that in a developing country context, marginal foreign exchange in the 
hand of the government will be used for investment, so the discount rate should be an 
investment discount rate rather than a consumption one. Thus, capital market distortions get 
reflected in the discount rate. Procedures for estimating the relevant social discount rate using 
the Little-Mirrlees approach may be found in Ray (1984) and Squire and van der Tak (1975). 
   A final argument for departing from the after-tax interest rate as the social discount rate 
arises when equity concerns are taken into account. In this case, the concerns will be 
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equity raises for cost-benefit analysis. 
 
VII.    RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 
 
      Until now we have assumed implicitly that future benefits and costs were known. This will 
almost never be the case. At best, project evaluators and households may know the probabilities 
of various project outcomes occurring. In these circumstances, there will be risks associated 
with the fact that outcomes may turn out to be good or bad. The literature on decision-making 
under risk tells us how to evaluate risky outcomes of any sort. We begin with a summary of the 
costs of risk-taking in general, and then consider how that might be taken account of in the 
cost-benefit analysis of public projects. 
   The  cost  of  risk-taking can be illustrated for the simplest case of a representative household 
facing uncertainty in a single dimension, say, their income. Let  i y   be the household’s income in 
state of nature i, where state i occurs with probability i π . The n possible states of nature are 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive, so ∑ =
n
i i 1π =1. The household’s preferences over alternative 
state-contingent outcomes are assumed to be ordered according to expected utility: 
() [] () i i i y u y u E ∑ = π  (20) 
where  () y u   is increasing and strictly concave, so the household is risk-averse ( 0 < ′ ′ u ). Then, for 
any set of state-contingent outcomes i y , the cost of risk can be defined as the amount of money 
the household would be willing to pay to avoid the risk. Formally, let k be the cost of risk. Then, 
it will satisfy: 
() ( ) ∑ = −
i i i y u k y u π  (21) 
where  ∑ ≡
i i iy y π   is expected income. Thus, k is the amount of income the household would be 
willing to forgo in order to avoid the uncertainty associated with the expected income stream.   
   The  cost  of  risk  k, which is implicitly defined in (21), can be expressed explicitly by applying 
a Taylor expansion around  y   to obtain an expression for  () i y u : 
() () () () () () R y y y u y y y u y u y u i i i + − ′ ′ + − ′ + =
2 5 . 0  (22) 
where R includes the higher-order terms. In what follows, we shall ignore these higher-order 
terms, and effectively use a second-order approximation for () i y u  in  the  right-hand side of (20). 
For risks that are relatively small compared with y, we can approximate the left-hand side of 
(21) to the first order by  () () () y u k y u k y u ′ − ≅ − . Combining this with (22) and using the definition 
of mean income,  ∑ ≡
i i iy y π , we obtain: 
()












− ≅  (23) 
where () () ∑ − =
i i i i y y y
2 var π  is the variance of income, and  () () y u / y u A ′ ′ ′ − =  is the coefficient of 32  R. Boadway / Public Policy Review 
absolute risk aversion. Thus, the cost of risk is higher the greater is the spread of outcomes and 
the more risk-averse is the household. 
      The cost of risk could in principle enter into cost-benefit analysis in two ways, directly and 
indirectly. The direct way involves uncertainty about the stream of net benefits of the project. If 
project returns are uncertain, the project evaluator could proceed in one of two ways. First, the 
projects benefits and costs could be measured in expected utility terms, using the analog of 
equation (20) above. That is, the expected utility of the project could be found by estimating the 
alternative streams of benefits and costs in real income terms and converting them to utility 
according to some assumption about the form of the utility function. This is likely to be very 
cumbersome. An alternative is to evaluate the benefits and costs in expected value terms and 
estimate a cost of risk associated with the uncertainty of the net benefit stream. This too is 
likely to be difficult.   
      Fortunately, it may be possibly to avoid taking account risks of a project even if the stream 
of net benefits is uncertain. That is because the risks may be diluted by risk-pooling or 
risk-sharing with other projects in the government sector. Risk-pooling refers to the case where 
the variance of a portfolio of projects is reduced if the portfolio is diversified with assets 
(projects) whose returns are to some extent independently distributed. Suppose a portfolio 
consists of n assets denoted  n , , i L 1 = , where the return on asset i is  i r , with mean  i r , and the 
share of the portfolio held as this asset is  i a . Let the variance of asset i and its covariance with 
asset j be: 
() () [ ] () () () [] j j i i j i i i i r r r r E r r , r r E r − − = − = cov      var
2  
The variance of the portfolio can be written: 
() () [ ] () () j i j i i i i i i r r a r a r a r a E r cov a 2 var var i
2 2 ∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ + = − =  
Thus, when assets are independently distributed,  ( ) 0 cov = j ir r , so   
() ( ) ( ) ∑ ∑ < = i i i i r a r a r var var var
2  
That is, the variance of the portfolio is less than the sum of the variances of the individual assets. 
In the simple case where the assets are all identical and independently distributed, we have 
n / ai 1 = , so   
() ( ) () ∑ = = n / r n / r r i i var var var
2  
As  n increases,  () r var  approaches zero. To the extent that risk-pooling exists among the 
projects in the public sector, this would suggest that the cost of risk associated with any one of 
them can be ignored when evaluating its costs and benefits. 
   W h i l e   r i s k -pooling involves diversification over independently distributed projects, 
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representative project whose (stochastic) return is r. And, suppose there are m identical persons 
sharing in the return of the project. In the case of public projects, m could be interpreted as the 
number of taxpayers. Each person then obtains a return of  m / r , whose variance is 
()() [] ()
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As the populations increases, the total project risk goes to zero, a result due to Arrow and Lind 
(1970). The implication is that if the project return is shared among a large number of taxpayers, 
the cost of risk can be safely ignored. 
   As mentioned, risk effects can also arise indirectly in cost-benefit analysis. To the extent 
that the financing of a project causes private sector investment to be crowded out, some risk 
that would otherwise have been incurred in the economy is now avoided. In the case considered 
earlier in equation (19), the opportunity cost of a yen’s worth of forgone investment when there 
was no reinvestment of asset income was simply  r / ρ . Suppose now that the rate of return on 
private investment included a risk premium of, say,  β   per yen of return. Then, the opportunity 
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In other words, risk-free rates of return should be used to evaluate the MCB. 
      The upshot of this section is that taking account of the cost of risk is a difficult task since 
these risks are typically not observable. Ignoring the direct costs of project risk may be justified 
if one can appeal to risk-pooling and/or risk-spreading arguments. As well, one can account for 
the indirect costs of risk by using a risk-free notion of MCB. Even so, there may be lingering 
doubts. In practice, these doubts are often addressed by sensitivity analysis. The project 
evaluator presents a range of estimates corresponding with optimistic through pessimistic 
scenarios with respect to net benefits, perhaps with some guess as to the chances of each 
outcome occurring. It is then up to the decision-maker to attach appropriate weights to the 
various outcomes. 
 
VIII.  INTERGENERATIONAL  EQUITY  ISSUES 
 
    Many public projects last for a long time, spanning several generations, and as such their net 
benefits accrue to both current and future cohorts. This is true not only of investment projects, 34  R. Boadway / Public Policy Review 
but of fiscal policies more generally. Changes in government debt, changes in social insurance 
programs and even tax reforms have as one of their main effects redistribution among 
generations, as Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) have emphasized. Government deficits are 
effectively postponed taxes, and provided the resulting debt is held long enough, this necessarily 
entails increased intergenerational transfers from the young to the old. Changes in unfunded 
public pensions have the same effect, as do other sorts of social programs funded out of current 
revenues, such as health care. And, major tax reforms have the same effect: substituting a 
consumption tax for a wage tax is effectively equivalent to an intergenerational transfer from the 
old to the young.
8 
   Evaluating policies that have as one of their prime effects an intergenerational transfer 
involves taking some view about the relative weights to be placed on future versus present 
generations. Given the prevalence of intergenerational transfers in government budgets and the 
importance of the issue for policy, in this section we outline the principles that economists 
might use to evaluate the intergenerational effects of government policy. Then, some 
methodologies that might be used to make these principles operational are discussed. Naturally, 
since we are dealing with transfers among households, value judgments are ultimately involved.   
 
VIII.1.    PRINCIPLES FOR EVALUATING INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS 
 
      Four potential principles are discussed, some of which are related and some of which are in 
conflict. 
 
VIII.1.1.    The Intergenerational Benefit Principle 
 
      The benefit principle is has a long-honored history in public finance. Although it has limited 
appeal as a distributive principle in static settings, it might be more attractive in an 
intergenerational setting. It would require each cohort to bear the costs of governments in 
accordance with the benefits they receive. Arguments for funding public pensions or for leaving 
the environment intact can be viewed as reflecting the benefit principle. 
   Properly attributing benefits on a cohort-by-cohort basis is a difficult task in itself, but 
there are problems of principle as well. The appeal of the benefit principle might seem to be that 
it is value-free in the sense that it entails no redistribution. However, that is a rather narrow 
interpretation. The benefit principle implicitly takes existing property rights as given and 
preferable to other allocations with different property rights. The inviolability of property rights 
does not reflect societal consensus for intra-generational equity, and there is no good reason 
                                                                            
8  Some have argued that intergenerational transfers imposed on the economy by the government will be 
undone by households through their bequest behavior (Barro 1974). However, there is little evidence that 
this will be the case, and there are good theoretical arguments why it should not be. See the summary of 
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why it would have more appeal in the intergenerational context. There is a further conceptual 
problem. Public programs presumably generate economic surpluses-total benefits exceed total 
costs-and these may be of a significant size. There is no natural way to apply the benefit 
principle to allocate costs among households without making some interpersonal judgment 
about how to allocate the surplus. 
      There is an even more serious problem with applying the benefit principle in an 
intergenerational context. Some assets, such as natural resources and the natural environment, 
are endowed to societies by nature. Government policies affect the stock of these natural assets, 
and therefore the amount that are passed on to future generations. Since these natural assets are 
owned by society at large, their property rights are not defined by cohort. The intergenerational 
benefit principle cannot be applied without specifically assigning property rights to natural 
assets to different generations to determine which generations are entitled to which shares of 
the fruits of these natural assets. Such a problem does not arise with respect to private assets, 
including those that are obtained from nature, since ownership is well defined. Moreover, it does 
not apply to government programs that are financed by taxes.   
   The fact that there is no natural way to assign property rights for natural assets across 
generations implies that the benefit principle in its usual form is in effect non-operative. To 
apply it would involve implicitly assigning such property rights, and one cannot do that without 
invoking some intergenerational equity judgment. Since aggregate intergenerational transfers in 
the comprehensive sense must take account of the amount of public assets passed on to future 
generations, some judgment must be made about intergenerational equity, if only implicitly.   
 
VIII.1.2.    Intergenerational Risk Sharing 
 
   A major difference among cohorts is the set of exogenous circumstances that affect their 
well-being. Given cohorts can be born lucky or unlucky because of the circumstances that apply 
a t  t h e i r  d a t e  o f  b i r t h  o r  o v e r  t h e i r  l i f e t i m e s ,  a n d  o v e r  w h i c h  t h e y  h a v e  n o  c o n t r o l .  T h e  
circumstances may be demographic: cohorts that are relatively large face a disadvantage relative 
to those that are relatively small. There may be shocks, such as a major war, that affect given 
cohorts. Natural catastrophes, such as earthquakes, weather shocks or disease occur from time 
to time. And, economic shocks, such as depressions, can affect cohorts during their working 
lives. In each of these cases, intergenerational transfers can provide a form of social insurance, 
where the insurance is social because markets cannot provide it.   
   There is some evidence that intergenerational risk does motivate governments to provide 
social insurance. Wars are financed largely by debt, and public pension programs have been 
instituted to assist those who were unlucky during their working lives. Of course, 
intergenerational transfers instituted for this purpose are by their nature temporary. 
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transfers. 
 
VIII.1.3.  Tax  Smoothing 
 
      A further argument for temporary intergenerational transfers is as a means of smoothing tax 
rates over time (Barro, 1974). Since the excess burden of tax distortions is convex in the tax rate, 
a given amount of revenues obtained over time from tax rates that fluctuate will have a larger 
deadweight loss than if the tax rates were smooth. This is related to the social insurance 
argument in the sense that the sources of fluctuating tax rates can be similar to those that lead 
to cohorts having better or worse fortune. But the argument is posed purely in efficiency terms. 
     The problem with the tax smoothing argument is that, in an intergenerational context, one 
cannot separate efficiency and equity arguments. Smoothing tax rates over time involves raising 
taxes for some cohorts and reducing them for others, which will give rise to the usual 
equity-efficiency trade-off. In this case, the equity side of the argument must rely on some 
intergenerational welfare comparison. 
 
VIII.1.4.  Intergenerational  Equity 
 
   As the above indicates, an evaluation of the net benefits of policies accruing to different 
cohorts necessarily involves an intergenerational comparison of welfare. This is especially 
apparent when there are systematic and persistent differences in well-being among different 
cohorts (and not just fluctuations). Intergenerational welfare comparisons necessarily involve 
value judgments, and settling on interpersonal equity norms is a major and well-known problem 
in policy evaluation. In the end, there must be some social consensus, and the political process 
obviously plays an important part in forging, interpreting and applying that consensus. That 
does not imply that there is no role for normative analysis as a complement to the positive study 
of the political process. On the contrary, normative analysis and even normative advocacy is an 
indispensable role of economists and other policy advisors: the political system does not take 
the form of a political marketplace that yields a determinant outcome.
9  In fact, one cannot 
avoid making interpersonal welfare comparisons in policy advice and evaluation, and 
presumably the basis for these comparisons that one is using should be made explicit. 
     There is likely broad consensus about some of the basic principles of redistributive equity, 
whether applied within or between generations. After all, governments are engaged heavily in 
redistribution, and the forms and extent of that redistribution are very similar across countries. 
Moreover, they are quite different than one might predict if one were starting with a public 
choice model based on purely self-interested voters. Since we have already discussed these 
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principles earlier when discussing the properties of the social welfare function, we need do no 
more than recall them here. They include the following, each of which has substantial meaning: 
•  Individualism: Individuals are the best judges of their own well-being. 
•  The Pareto principle: Policies that make some persons better off and no one worse off 
are preferred policies. 
•  Aversion to inequality: All other things being equal, society prefers outcomes in which 
welfare is more equally distributed to those in which it is less equally distributed, 
where the degree of inequality aversion depends partly on ideology, and partly on the 
perceived severity of the equity efficiency trade-off.  
•  Equality of opportunity: Not all sources of inequality might be judged relevant for 
redistributive correction. The ‘principle of compensation’ suggests that persons ought 
to be compensated only for those adverse outcomes that are due to factors outside their 
control, such as their productive ability, their health, and their date of birth. But, if 
persons are responsible for adverse outcomes (e.g., low incomes) because of the way 
they have freely chosen to behave, these differences ought not to be compensated: the 
‘principle of responsibility’. The principles of compensation and responsibility together 
lead to the idea of equality of opportunity as one of the guiding principles of 
redistribution: opportunities that households face, as reflected in say their budget 
possibilities, ought to be equalized.
10  The principle of equality of opportunity gives rise 
to important policy instruments like education and health care alongside the 
tax-transfer system. 
•  Social insurance: Households might be subject to unexpected shocks over which they 
have no control and against which they cannot fully insure. Or, they may simply be 
uninsurable at birth. Private insurance might fail to address unemployment as well. 
These kinds of arguments constitute the major reason for the substantial programs of 
social insurance implemented by most OECD countries. 
While there is obviously not universal agreement on the details of application of these principles, 
there seems to be enough of a consensus about their relevance to take us a long way in judging in 
qualitative terms at least minimal standards of redistribution that should apply. Although we 
may be less used to applying them with respect to intergenerational redistribution, there seems 
to be no particular reason why such an extension would not reflect societal consensus. For 
example, widely held concerns about the environment are based on notions of intergenerational 
equity. Given these principles, we can imagine applying an intergenerational social welfare 
function analogous to (1) in an intergenerational context. This would lead to using welfare 
weights in aggregating the costs and benefits accruing to various cohorts.   
      Some might argue that the normative principles of intergenerational economic justice are in 
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any case hardly sufficient for evaluating public policies that impact on different cohorts. There 
may be no clear consensus about the degree of aversion to inequality that should be applied to 
intergenerational transfers, and the future may be fraught with uncertainty. It might also be 
argued that governments are overly short-sighted and will discount the benefits of future 
generations who, after all, are not part of the voting constituency. More important, political 
outcomes may differ from the interests of citizens. If the political process is inherently 
inefficient, wasteful and captive of special interests, special attention needs to be devoted to 
deviations of policy outcomes from what the electorate truly wants. On the other hand, political 
processes may be efficient with political competition leading to outcomes that approximate the 
social consensus. In that case, if governments discount the welfare of future generations, it is 
because that reflects the social consensus among those currently alive. If one does not like the 
social consensus that has been formed, one can always try to persuade the public that it should 
adopt a different consensus. That is part of the role of normative analysis. 
 
VIII.2.    ACCOUNTING FOR INTERGENERATIONAL EFFECTS 
 
   Incorporating intergenerational equity weights into policy evaluation is a difficult matter. 
To make a well-informed judgment, one would ideally need to have the following types of 
information, in addition to the effects of policies on the welfare of different cohorts: 
•  A comprehensive measure of the extent of public indebtedness, including all types of 
net tax obligations passed on to members to current and future generations that are 
implicit in existing tax policies; 
•  An account of the full benefits of government policies to existing and future generations, 
given some presumption about the path of government policies far enough into the 
future; 
•  An estimate of the allocation of the benefits of the stock of natural capital to existing 
and future generations, given the government policy stance; and 
•  A measure of the relative levels of well-being of existing and future generations, given 
the policies that are in place. 
These are very difficult to obtain practically as well as conceptually. However, there are some 
accounting procedures that can help in informing policy judgments. These fall under the general 
rubric of generational accounting, a procedure developed to capture the amount of 
intergenerational transfers that are implicit in current policy stances.
11  
      Generational accounting assigns to members of currently alive and future generations the net 
costs of financing existing fiscal policies projected into the future. It is purely an accounting 
exercise, with no account taken of behavioral responses to the fiscal policies. The building block 
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is a cohort’s generational account, which is the present value of the net taxes that the 
representative household of a given age cohort is liable to pay either over their full lifetime, or 
their remaining lifetime, as the case may be. Net taxes include tax liabilities of all forms 
attributed to the household less transfers received and less whatever types of government 
expenditures can be attributed to the household, such as health and education. Generational 
accounts can then be converted to generational lifetime net tax rates by dividing them by the 
present value of lifetime income. 
   Generational accounts or net tax rates themselves can be used to compare the lifetime net 
tax rates for various cohorts, giving some indication of intergenerational transfers implicit in a 
given policy stance. Moreover, they can be used to calculate the burden that would be left for 
future generations from alternative government policies. The basis for this is the government’s 
intertemporal budget constraint, which requires that the present value of the government’s future 
stream of net taxes (taxes net of transfers and expenditures that can be attributed to cohorts) 
equal its existing debt and the present value of its future stream of expenditures. The future 
stream of net taxes can be disaggregated into those attributable to currently alive and future 
cohorts. For each currently alive cohort, a generational account is calculated consisting of the 
present value of net taxes owing from the current period to the predicted end of life. The present 
value of net taxes owed by all future generations is then the sum of current government net debt 
and the present value of future expenditure obligations less the sum of generational accounts for 
all those currently alive. These obligations left for future generations are then typically assumed 
to be shared equally among all future cohorts to give an idea of the burden that on average is left 
for future generations. In effect, the net liabilities of the government as of today, its public 
indebtedness, are amortized over all future generations:    they all share in the paying debt. 
      The resulting calculations are very suggestive, and provide a useful tool for capturing at least 
some of the effects of the extent of intergenerational transfers implicit in existing policies. 
There can obviously be disputes about the various assumptions built into the calculations with 
respect to future policies, population, the assignment of taxes and transfers to various age 
cohorts, and so on. For our purposes, a more interesting question is how suitable are properly 
measured generational accounts for evaluating policies involving intergeneration redistribution. 
We can identify a number of shortcomings of the current methodology of generational 
accounting as a complete measure of the intergenerational effects of a government’s policy 
stance. 
 
Forward- and Backward-Looking Generational Accounts. The generational accounting method is 
forward looking in the sense that the accounts for those currently alive include only the net tax 
liabilities for the remainder of their lives. Thus, one does not get a full picture of the 
intergenerational transfers that have applied to them over their full lifetimes. This makes it 
difficult to evaluate policies that affect both present and future generations. 40  R. Boadway / Public Policy Review 
Public Capital. Generational accounts do not take takes account of the public capital stock and 
infrastructure that exists at the current time. Public capital yields services that are of benefit to 
current and future generations, and these should be included as an element of the benefits 
received. In practice, these would presumably be very difficult to estimate and evaluate. 
 
Natural Capital. Natural resource wealth and environmental capital that are commonly owned are 
not included in generational accounts, despite the fact that they constitute a form of asset 
wealth that is shared among generations. Natural capital differs from the public capital stock in 
the sense that it has not been produced using public resources. Nonetheless, the benefit it 
provides to different cohorts depends on government policy. In principle, one could attribute to 
generations the benefit that they obtain from natural capital, but that would be a heroic 
undertaking.  
 
Intangible Public Capital. The most difficult assets to value are the invisible ones, such as 
accumulated knowledge, social capital or the society’s institutions. Yet the passing on of 
intangible assets from one generation to the next represents an important form of 
intergenerational transfer. 
 
Measures of Generational Well-Being. Finally, in order to make a judgment about the effects of 
intergenerational transfers, it would be useful to have measures of how well off future 
generations will be relative to current generations. There is a presumption in the generational 
accounting literature that the intergenerational balance is achieved when there is parity of 
generational accounts or of lifetime net tax rates among different generations. But that might 
only be the case if all generations are also equally well off. Otherwise, unlucky cohorts should 
have lower lifetime net tax rates. 
 
   Despite these difficulties and drawbacks, the concept of generational accounting is a 
suitable first step to evaluating changes in intergenerational transfers, and one that serves as a 
basis for future development. Even if the evaluator is not prepared to subscribe to a particular 
value judgment about intergenerational equity, it might still be helpful to inform policy-makers 
of the intergenerational outcomes that are implicit in their policies. The tool of generational 
accounting provides a promising approach since it focuses precisely on the relative financial 
burdens imposed on different cohorts, living and unborn, that will satisfy the government’s 
intertemporal spending requirements.   
 
Ⅸ.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
 
      In this paper, we have summarized the main issues in the evaluation of projects. It is obvious   R. Boadway / Public Policy Review 41 
from our discussion that project evaluation is very much an art, although one with scientific 
underpinnings. Our purpose has been to indicate what those scientific underpinnings are, so 
that readers can have an economic perspective on what is involved. The technical literature on 
project evaluation is a well-established one, but one which must evolve with the times. Recent 
advances in economic theory have probably not yet been incorporated into project evaluation 
principles to the extent that they could be. For example, the importance of asymmetric 
information and its implications for market behavior and market failure have been very much in 
the forefront of economic analysis. Yet, little has been done to incorporate imperfect information 
into project evaluation rules. This is particularly true insofar as the existence of imperfect 
information has implications for unemployment.  Similarly, there has been considerable 
research activity into studying the determinants of growth, and whether or not unfettered 
markets are conducive to high growth rates. Little of this has found its way into applied welfare 
economics. Finally, the importance of illegal or underground activity has been increasingly 
recognized. This too might have implications for project evaluation. As with everything else in 
economics, project evaluation will presumably evolve. 42  R. Boadway / Public Policy Review 
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